USA v. Bryce Harper by unknown
ALD-175        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2:13-cr-00062-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 6, 2021 
 
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Bryce Harper appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for compassionate release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  The Government has filed a motion for summary 
affirmance.  For the following reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In 2015, Harper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 
to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable 
amount of heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  The District Court accepted the 
parties’ stipulated sentence of 228 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years 
of supervised release.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 In July 2020, Harper filed a motion for compassionate release.1  He argued that 
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances exist because, if he were convicted today 
for the same crimes, he would likely receive a “dramatically lower sentence [than] the 
one that [he is] currently serving.”  (ECF 535, at 1.)  In support of that assertion, Harper 
relied on his age (33), rehabilitation while in prison, and strong family ties.  (ECF 535, at 
2-3.)  Although Harper conceded that he has “no medical condition,” he also alleged that 
release was warranted because there had been an increase in the number of inmate cases 
 
1 Harper had first sought compassionate release from the warden of FCI-Fort Dix; the 




of COVID-19 at FCI Fort Dix.  (ECF 560.)  He further suggested that compassionate 
release was warranted based on application of § 401 of the First Step Act and 
Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines.  (ECF 535, at 2-3.)   
The District Court denied the motion in an order dated October 16, 2020.  (ECF 
563.)  Harper appealed.  (ECF 575.)  We vacated the District Court’s order and remanded 
to the District Court for consideration of Harper’s claim that he had contracted COVID-
19.  United States v. Harper, C.A. No. 20-3213 (order entered Feb. 23, 2021).  In the 
District Court, the Government opposed the § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, noting that Harper 
apparently had recovered from COVID-19.  (ECF 586).  The District Court again denied 
relief, finding Harper “has not given any reasons—medical or otherwise—that would 
constitute ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons for release.”   Furthermore, the District 
Court explained that, “even if [Harper’s] virus symptoms were active, the sentencing 
factors here weigh so heavily in favor of continued incarceration that [Harper’s] Motion 
would still fail, absent a showing that he was not receiving adequate care through the 
BOP (and even then, the Court is not convinced that release would be the appropriate 
method of resolution).”  Finally, the District Court held that § 401 of the First Step Act 
and Amendment 782 were inapplicable or moot.  (ECF 588.)  Harper again appeals.  
(ECF 589.) 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review for abuse of discretion 
the denial of an eligible defendant’s motion for a sentence modification under § 3582(c).  
See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020).  Thus, we “will not 
4 
 
disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the 
relevant factors.”  Id. (alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).  We may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam).  
The compassionate release provision states that a district court “may reduce the 
term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider 
“the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”  
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).  Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes 
of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).   
Upon review, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that Harper failed to demonstrate that relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is 
warranted.2  Even if there were an extraordinary and compelling reason for 
 
2 Furthermore, the District Court properly concluded that § 401 of the First Step of 2018 
is inapplicable to Harper, who was sentenced in 2015, see United States v. Aviles, 938 
5 
 
compassionate release, the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not support relief.  Harper had 
an extensive prior criminal history, including prior drug convictions.  In particular, his 
prior offenses included a conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, as well 
as two separate convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.  
Moreover, Harper was involved in a large-scale drug conspiracy that involved the 
distribution of a significant amount of heroin.  Furthermore, Harper’s sentence of 228 
months was well below the Sentencing Guidelines’ range of 262 to 327 months.  See 
United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that sentence 
reduction was not warranted where, among other factors, “the court had already varied 
downward by five years from Ruffin’s guidelines range when imposing [a] lengthy 
sentence”).  And, at the time the motion was filed, Harper had served less than half of his 
sentence.  See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (stating that “the time remaining in [the] 
sentence may—along with the circumstances underlying the motion for compassionate 
release and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated inmates—
inform whether immediate release would be consistent with” the § 3553(a) factors).    
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
F.3d 503, 510 (3d Cir. 2019), and that his sentence already accounted for Amendment 
782, which became effective in 2014, see United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 321 (3d 
Cir. 2020). 
